Ethically speaking, I’m waiting for B1-66ER or the hot humanlike cylons of Battlestar Galactica to show up and make a claim for personhood. Or possibly for someone’s RealDoll (NSFW), Roxxy True Companion (also NSFW), or Anydroid (NSFW — yes, again) to become imbued with enough AI to say “Not tonight, dear, I have a headache” (or to be able to say “No” and mean it.)
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Posted by
Linda MacDonald Glenn on 06/04 at 06:01 AM
Thanks for the nod, Jonathan—I just wanted to clarify that I, too, think that all human beings ought be considered persons, regardless of cognitive capacity—to say otherwise suggests that those who are mentally or physically disabled are not worthy of moral status.
I think other ethicists have labeled it “personhood plus” (or H+!), in the sense that personhood ought to be more inclusive, not exclusive.
Posted by
Jønathan Lyons on 06/04 at 09:22 AM
Thanks for your comment and insight, Linda!
Posted by
nude0007 on 06/04 at 10:42 AM
In a post on Tiffany’s debates a few months back, I chimed in on a person-hood discussion and was astounded to find that the majority of responders could not conceive of giving an AI rights if it fit the description of sentience, yet had no problem giving a blob of tissue that had the promise of sentience, still unattained, those same rights. My hope for humanity, whom I thought was becoming smarter and better, were dashed and I quit the forum.
Posted by
André on 06/04 at 11:55 AM
Jønathan, thanks for the piece. It is always positive to show how matters are more complicated then it seems - and also, it is important to examine from close our traditional prejudices. But, together with Linda, I would not treat “personhood” as an exclusive club, with cognitive rules of admission.
@Linda
I like the notion of extended, inclusive personhood. And of course I agree with your caveat. We should indeed stop this search for bizarre, exclusive criteria - and focus on why each of us want to be alive, to enjoy the world around, and to avoid unwanted, painful experiences.
@nude0007
It is a bit strange to tailor a certain notion of personhood - meant to fit entities that do not exist (yet), but not supposed to apply to a necessary developmental stage of multicellular lifeforms (i.e. “the blob of tissue”). In other words, why are we ready to negate now the right to exist to a number of very real non-sentient creatures, just to include possible ghosts from the future?
Posted by
Jønathan Lyons on 06/05 at 07:48 AM
@nude007: The main problem with the personhood-for-fertilized-eggs people is that while they use the language of this discussion, they are motivated by what they perceive as a bioconservative religious and/or control motivation, by which I mean that they appear to be motivated by a desire to control the sexual behaviors of women, or because they think that their religion compels them to fight against the termination of unwanted pregnancies.
By comparison, people on the more technoprogressive side of things seek to break the limits of mainstream/bioconservative thinking, which classifies only homo sapiens sapiens as persons/people, and refuses to consider further possibilities, or that such a way of classifying persons/people might be too limited for the task.