Andrew Fenton Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fresno, and Adjunct of the Faculty of Graduate Studies in the Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University.
My research interests are the philosophical implications of re-seeing many nonhuman animals as living within norm-laden contexts of action. In particular, I am interested in how such a re-seeing can enrich traditional discussions of epistemic justification, including evidence gathering, as well as pro-social behavior and its relation to moral agency.
It has also contributed to my interest in animal research ethics, particularly in the area of nonhuman primate research, and how our growing knowledge of nonhuman primate agential capacities ought to change our attitudes about seeking their participation in captive research. I am also interested in the nature and extent of cognitive diversity in humans and how this ought to impact societal approaches to difference in cognitive capacities among these individuals.
The latter interest has lead me to explore not only some of the assumptions or arguments that give rise to seeing certain humans (e.g., autistic individuals) as 'dysfunctional' but to problematizing judgments or descriptions that highlight difference to the detriment of accepting variation.
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The Personhood Beyond the Human conference was organized by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, the Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics at Yale University, Yale's Animal Ethics Group and Yale's Technology and Ethics Group.
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Abstract: Included among the issues lurking in the background of the debate increasingly raging over animal morality are the preferences associated with expectations of treatment at work in the social dynamics of the relevant communities. This kind of phenomenon places us -- that is, humans -- very quickly in an encounter with other-than-human animals who prefer to be treated in some ways and not others and enforce these preferences when it is prudent for them to do so. The significance of the relevant behavioral evidence about these animals should be apparent to applied ethicists. The first section briefly highlights some chimpanzee behavioral capacities relevant to the rest of my argument. This grounds what I will then rehearse about the moral significance of chimpanzee dissent that I have defended elsewhere. The third section will outline how the previous two sections warrant changes in our treatment of chimpanzees in captive contexts (or any future contexts). In particular, three conclusions follow: (i) dissent ought to affect the inclusion of dissenting chimpanzees in research, (ii) their use in harmful research cannot be justified through a generic benefit argument and (iii) escape clauses for the reintroduction of chimpanzee research where it is now being eliminated are not justified.
Image: http://gaia-health.com/gaia-blog/2011-12-11/rats-free-a-trapped-
buddy-over-eating-chocolate-and-then-share-it/
On December 7, 2013 Andrew Fenton spoke on "chimpanzee dissent and trapdoor clauses" at the Personhood Beyond the Human conference at Yale University.
Andrew Fenton Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fresno, and Adjunct of the Faculty of Graduate Studies in the Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University.
My research interests are the philosophical implications of re-seeing many nonhuman animals as living within norm-laden contexts of action. In particular, I am interested in how such a re-seeing can enrich traditional discussions of epistemic justification, including evidence gathering, as well as pro-social behavior and its relation to moral agency.
It has also contributed to my interest in animal research ethics, particularly in the area of nonhuman primate research, and how our growing knowledge of nonhuman primate agential capacities ought to change our attitudes about seeking their participation in captive research. I am also interested in the nature and extent of cognitive diversity in humans and how this ought to impact societal approaches to difference in cognitive capacities among these individuals.
The latter interest has lead me to explore not only some of the assumptions or arguments that give rise to seeing certain humans (e.g., autistic individuals) as 'dysfunctional' but to problematizing judgments or descriptions that highlight difference to the detriment of accepting variation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
The Personhood Beyond the Human conference was organized by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, the Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics at Yale University, Yale's Animal Ethics Group and Yale's Technology and Ethics Group.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract: Included among the issues lurking in the background of the debate increasingly raging over animal morality are the preferences associated with expectations of treatment at work in the social dynamics of the relevant communities. This kind of phenomenon places us -- that is, humans -- very quickly in an encounter with other-than-human animals who prefer to be treated in some ways and not others and enforce these preferences when it is prudent for them to do so. The significance of the relevant behavioral evidence about these animals should be apparent to applied ethicists. The first section briefly highlights some chimpanzee behavioral capacities relevant to the rest of my argument. This grounds what I will then rehearse about the moral significance of chimpanzee dissent that I have defended elsewhere. The third section will outline how the previous two sections warrant changes in our treatment of chimpanzees in captive contexts (or any future contexts). In particular, three conclusions follow: (i) dissent ought to affect the inclusion of dissenting chimpanzees in research, (ii) their use in harmful research cannot be justified through a generic benefit argument and (iii) escape clauses for the reintroduction of chimpanzee research where it is now being eliminated are not justified.
Image: http://gaia-health.com/gaia-blog/2011-12-11/rats-free-a-trapped-
buddy-over-eating-chocolate-and-then-share-it/
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9mwyEfV3gc