A couple of days ago, Michael tweeted the link to the podcast episode, with these two comments:

Can science tell us what is ‘moral’? Shermer (yes) v. Pigliucci (no, not sure, don’t know, maybe, depends, doubtful)

and:

Is female genital mutilation wrong? Shermer (yes) v. Pigliucci (depends, sometimes, in some cultures yes in others no)

I was a bit surprised by this, as well as taken aback. Surprised because I thought I made very clear, during the live discussion, that I do think female genital mutilation is wrong, and gave my reasons for it. Taken aback because, frankly, tens of thousands of people may now think that I am a moral relativist (including my 16 years old daughter!), which I am most definitely not, and that I have no principled objection to female genital mutilation, which I definitely do.

After an email exchange with Michael, we both agree that I would publish this post to rectify the record, and that he would tweet it to his followers, with the same aim. Below you will find three items: first, a transcript of the bits of the podcast where I explain my position on female genital mutilation; second, a transcript of the bits of the podcast where I explain my position on the relationship between science and philosophy when it comes to ethical issues; third, a question that Michael sent me directly, asking me to include it in this post, and my response.

I want to thank Michael for yet another example of how to conduct civil and productive discourse in the skeptic community. We will continue to disagree, but hopefully our thoughts will stimulate discussion and understanding.

1. On female genital mutilation

@15:20 [Michael] So Massimo, back to my opening example. Would you say that in some cultures female genital mutilation is morally acceptable? You think it’s ok.

[Massimo] No, I don’t.

[Michael] Why? On what basis?

[Massimo] I don’t because I don’t think it is ethical to force especially a child, especially somebody who cannot actually object to it, to undergo pain for arbitrary reasons that are not useful to the person. It’s okay to undergo pain for reasons that are not arbitrary and are good for you. Like, you know, if you have to have an operation to get a tumor out of the way, well that’s going to cause you pain. And if I have to do it on a child, even without her consent, I think that’s ethically acceptable. But in [the other] case I don’t. Now, this was the short story, then we can get into a more complex discussion because in fact the choice of the child, the welfare of the child, is not just as simple as a question of, as a matter of, pain or not pain. There is also the societal context, because as it turns out if you don’t do it the children will suffer because they live in a certain society. Now I still think that doesn’t outweigh the idea that genital mutilation is wrong, so I still think it should be objected to.

@18:19 [Michael] I think we can do better than what you just said about female genital mutilation. I think we can do better than that. Than just say well, you know, in Western democratic cultures it’s wrong, but for those other cultures...

[Massimo] That is not at all what I said. I said that it is wrong, period.

[Michael] How do you know that it’s wrong period?

[Massimo} I think I explained that I think it’s wrong to impose pain for arbitrary reasons. And those are arbitrary reasons, as I said, as opposed to I’m going to cure you of a tumor.

[Michael] What are you basing that on?

[Massimo] That’s not based on any empirical evidence whatsoever, because what empirical evidence would that be, that people don’t want to feel pain and want to feel pleasure? If that were all the basis to our morality we could just hook ourselves to a drug machine for the rest of our lives. we would be very happy and not in pain. And yet most of us don’t think that’s a reasonable thing to do. Why not?

2. On the relationship between science and philosophy as it pertains to ethics

@19:54 [Massimo] By the way, I should, again, just in case there is some doubt, I should reiterate that I don’t think science is irrelevant. In fact, no moral philosopher thinks science is irrelevant, or [that] empirical evidence is irrelevant to these discussions. It’s a question of how do we balance things out.

@23:09 [Michael] Why not add [science]? It’s a great tool.

[Massimo] But who is arguing against adding it?

[Michael] You seem to be.

[Massimo] No, I don’t think so. We need to be careful about making this distinction. Again, I don’t think any reasonable moral philosopher would object to importing empirical evidence, empirical issues, into discussions of morality. The question is how much does that empirical information weigh.

@23:53 [Massimo] As I said during my talk before this discussion here, the major distinction, or a major distinction, between science and philosophy, and the reason I do think that they really do need to both work together on these and other issues, is that science deals with the empirical world, and philosophy tends to deal with logical possibilities. ... Logical possibilities are much broader than empirical possibilities, which is another way to rephrase Julia’s question a minute ago. Which is science constantly will underdetermine, the empirical information, will constantly underdetermine our ethical problems, because our ethical problems are a question of conflicts of values. We need to explain to ourselves and to others why is it that certain things need to take priority over others. The empirical information is relevant, but it doesn’t determine a unique answer.

3. Michael’s question and my response

Massimo, you and I agree that Female Genital Mutilation is morally wrong, but can you say that it is absolutely, objectively wrong? That is, can you do more than say you personally think it is wrong but you acknowledge that other people in different cultures than ours think it is acceptable, and that being the case you cannot condemn their actions against women as immoral? The point I was trying to make in my lecture and in our discussion is that I go so far as to say that there is no moral universe (culture, worldview, etc.) in which FGM is not immoral, based on the fundamental moral principle of not harming individuals. I argue that the individual is the fundamental moral agent because the individual is the primary target of natural selection, and thus it is in our nature to survive and flourish, and so actions that permanently rob us of our nature are immoral. Thus, I can deduce that permanently mutilating women robs them of their right to flourish as fully human individuals. Likewise, banning gays from getting married is immoral (and, conversely, gay marriage is moral) because it robs these individuals of their right to survive and flourish according to their nature. You apparently reject my argument for this basis of morality. You and I agree on these two issues (FGM is immoral, gay marriage is moral), but I think our disagreement is in WHY. I claim that FGM is absolutely and objectively morally wrong, and that we can defend this position in a solid scientific argument. You apparently disagree with this. If so, can you explain WHY you think FGM is wrong?

Michael, let me unpack your claim, before I explain (again) my position on female genital mutilation, gay marriage and the like. Your argument seems to be:

1. The individual is the primary target of natural selection.

2. (1) Makes the individual the fundamental moral agent.

3. Natural selection favors human survival and flourishing.

4. From (3), human nature demands the survival and flourishing of the individual.

5. Anything that violates (4) is immoral.

6. FGM (or the prohibition against gay marriage, or other things) violates (4).

7. Therefore, (from 2, 5 and 6) FGM is morally wrong.

Premise (1) can be questioned. Indeed, it is a well known problem for individual-based selection theories to explain the evolution of altruism and of moral sentiments more generally. Some sort of group selection seems necessary, though I don’t have a definitive position on that. Still, I will let this premise stand for the sake of argument.

To derive (2) from (1) is a non sequitur. Since natural selection has targeted every individual of every other species, and yet the category “moral” seems to apply only to human beings (and perhaps a few other species), something is clearly missing in your account. I suggest that what is missing is the evolution of a brain capable of self-reflection, as well as the entire phenomenon of cultural evolution. Those are crucial conditions that have to occur in order to be able to talk about morality. Nonetheless, let’s proceed as if.

(3) is clearly wrong: natural selection promotes the survival and reproduction of individuals, the concept of flourishing doesn’t enter into it. (Notice that already at this point your argument has crumbled, since all one has to show is that one or more of the premises is untenable. But let’s continue.)

(4) would indeed logically follow from (3), except for the fact that (3) itself is not true.

(5) is a stipulation for which you give no argument. I may agree, but then again it is easy to come  up with counter examples: when we punish a member of society for wrong doing we usually deprive him of his ability to flourish (and sometimes to survive, via the death penalty). But surely you will agree that that is morally permissible. Except that to justify punishment for moral wrong doing we need to explain why we allow exceptions to (5). This would quickly lead us to a philosophical discussion of rights, justice, etc.

(6) is a stipulation, with which I agree. But not for the reason you give, since in your case it is based on (4), which in turn relies on (3), and I reject the latter. (See below for my positive reasons.)

Given all the above, your conclusion (7) does not follow logically from your premises.

And yet, as you noted, we do agree that FGM is wrong, so I need to explain why by way of a different account from your own.

To begin with, the way you asked the question seems to me to lead to a false dichotomy: either one thinks that FGM is “absolutely, objectively wrong,” or one is a moral relativist. But the options afforded by moral philosophy are much broader than that. Once again, I am not a moral relativist. But you seem to be a strong moral realist (“absolutely, objectively”), which is a very untenable position (ironically, it puts you in the company of Kant — though for different reasons from his own — and that should make you feel uncomfortable).

My position is that morality in the modern sense is the result of a process of evolution favoring pro-social behavior (not “flourishing”), which we can trace to other species of primates, followed by millennia of self-reflection and discussion among human beings (i.e., cultural evolution, which doesn’t enter into your scenario at all). As such, I think moral precepts are contingently (as opposed to absolutely) and non-arbitrarily (as opposed to “objectively”) true. Neither of those two qualifiers comes even close to moral relativism. The contingency arises from the fact that morality makes sense only for certain types of intelligent, conscious, social animals, like us. If we were a radically different type of organism we may have developed different moral norms, or perhaps no morality at all. Non-arbitrariness separates morality from, say, rules of etiquette. But ethics is often an issue of balancing contrasting rights and alternative norms of behavior, so that there may be more than one reasonable way to address a particular moral problem, and none of the reasonable alternatives may be objectively better than another one.

Let me give you a simple example before we finally turn to FGM. Consider Michael Sandel’s discussion of the recent practice of lobbyists in Congress to pay homeless or poor people to secure a place for them for a particular hearing in which they are interested (while presumably they have lunch at an expensive restaurant nearby). Some people consider the practice wrong, because it bypasses the standard system of queuing, which allows interested citizens (not just lobbyists) to attend congressional hearings. The idea is that buying a place in a queue goes counter to the egalitarian purpose of the queue, limits access to the democratic process by ordinary citizens, and undermines the integrity of the institution of Congress. Others, however, argue that the practice of queue-buying is justified because it deploys a market approach to the problem of limited seating (if you really want to go there, you show that by how much you are willing to pay), and it has the positive side effect of giving money to the poor or homeless.

Which view is absolutely, objectively right? Empirical evidence here simply doesn’t enter into it, since everyone agrees on the relevant facts (which, needless to say, are not “scientific” facts, but mundane, everyday observational facts). The way a moral philosopher would go about it (read Sandel’s chapter, it’s illuminating) is by unpacking the premises of the contrasting positions, exploring what they logically entail, thereby clarifying the problem. But at some point we need to decide what we value more: equal access by citizens to government, efficiency of the system, collateral benefits (such as money for the homeless), or what? There are plenty of wrong answers, but not necessarily a clear (absolute, objective) winner, and the empirical evidence — though relevant — underdetermines the problem.

And now back to female genital mutilation. As I said in the podcast (see transcripts above) I think it is wrong because I subscribe to a broader moral principle: that it is wrong to impose pain on others, particularly if unable to object, for arbitrary reasons. From the broader principle I derive my specific objection to FGM, since the reasons advanced by its supporters are indeed arbitrary. The qualification that followed during the podcast, and which may have engendered your confusion about my position, is that even though FGM is wrong, there are a number of consequences for girls who do not undergo the procedure when they enter the adult population, since they will be shunned by men in their own society. This sort of consequence very much affects the ability of those women to flourish, don’t you think? Still, I remain convinced that, on balance, and despite the risk of not being able to marry and have a family, FGM is wrong and needs to be condemned. In other words, I think those societies — and especially their male members — should revise their moral system. But this isn’t the result of any calculus about the women’s overall degree of flourishing, it’s the result of ethical reflection that leads me to condemn the practice despite the fact that women who do not undergo it, in those societies, will very likely have lower flourishing than they would otherwise.

Now, you can ask me where the broader principle that causing pain for arbitrary reasons to non-consenting human beings comes from. There we agree that by nature human beings recoil from pain and suffering, so that other things being equal this should be avoided. But I frame this within the context of my preferred moral framework, virtue ethics, not on an evolutionary account (because natural selection doesn’t favor flourishing — Aristotle himself was big on human nature, obviously without any input from evolutionary theory). Notice, of course, that there are plenty of other things we could ascribe to human nature (e.g., violence, xenophobia) which I think are wrong on ethical grounds, but which you would have a hard time criticizing (since they did evolve, possibly by natural selection).

[I should add, to hopefully prevent further misinterpretation, that we hardly need “science” to give us the basic outline of human nature, just like we don’t need, say, an fMRI scan to tell us that a girl undergoing genital mutilation is in pain. That said, in some cases we may want actual science, especially psychology, to come to the table with empirically relevant input.]

Finally, FGM is a bad example for our discussion, since we both agree that it is wrong, though we arrive at that conclusion very differently. Much more informative would be to debate cases where we disagree on the ethical judgment itself (perhaps the queue-buying one mentioned above?). That would be more revealing of our differences, but I guess we’ll have to leave it for another time.