Center for Responsible
Nanotechnology - January, 2003

Introduction

The development of
general-purpose molecular
manufacturing through

nanotechnology
carries numerous

risks, including the production of potentially unhealthy
nanoparticles, the possible creation of tiny, destructive,
self-replicating robots, and many others. The Precautionary
Principle is often invoked when dealing with situations that
might be hazardous; however, the label "Precautionary
Principle" is attached to at least two different ideas,
which must be analyzed separately.

This paper discusses
two forms of the Precautionary Principle, which we will call
the "strict form" and the "active form", and relates them to
the

purpose of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology,
and to CRN's policy recommendations.

Two Forms of the Precautionary Principle

The strict form of the Precautionary
Principle requires inaction when action might pose a risk.
An example of this form is shown in the following quote from
an article on regulating nanotechnology: "The principle,
itself a topic of debate, was designed to reduce
environmental and health risks by limiting scientific
exploration when its impact is in doubt."1

In contrast, the active form calls for
choosing less risky alternatives when they are available,
and for taking responsibility for potential risks. For
example, Article 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development states: "Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation."2
In other words, if damage is likely but not certain, the
lack of absolute certainty is no excuse for failing to
mitigate the damage.

The strict form of the Precautionary
Principle is similar to the maxim often attributedfalsely3to
the Hippocratic Oath: "First, do no harm." If action may
cause harm, then inaction is preferable. In particular, if
scientific investigation could lead to harm or risk, then
that line of research should not be pursued. There are two
problems with this guideline. First, almost any action
creates a certain amount of risk, and this is especially
true of research that seeks to answer unsolved questions.
Strict adherence to this guideline would prevent virtually
all scientific endeavors. Second, inaction carries its own
risks, which may be greater than the risks of action. By its
bias toward inaction, the strict version can create
increased risk. A scientific endeavor with great potential
for mitigating one risk, and small potential for creating
another, would be forbidden by the strict version.

This reading is not merely the result of
journalistic carelessness. Some policy advocates have
followed this course. For example, in an article
recommending the application of the Precautionary Principle
to genetically modified crops, Dr. Mae Wan Ho writes: "It is
up to the perpetrators to prove that the technology is safe
beyond reasonable doubt."4

The active form of the Precautionary
Principle urges more action instead of less. When a
potential risk is identified, the appropriate response is to
search for less risky alternatives, and use them instead if
practical. The Precautionary
Principle In Action: A Handbook5
lists five components of a precautionary approach:

• Taking precautionary action before
  scientific certainty of cause and effect


• Setting goals


• Seeking out and evaluating
  alternatives


• Shifting burdens of proof


• Developing more democratic and
  thorough decision-making criteria and methods

The active form does
not automatically forbid risky activities; instead, it calls
for an appropriate effort to mitigate the riskwhich may
well involve finding and choosing a different activity.

Applying the Precautionary Principle to
Nanotechnology

Molecular
manufacturing technology is currently the subject of much
scientific uncertainty. Several prominent scientists have
gone on record with the opinion that self-copying machines
built by nanotechnology are impossible, or at least
sufficiently difficult that they will never be built.6
On the other hand, some scientists believe that such a thing
is quite feasible.7
The question is important, because if a self-copying machine
was deliberately designed with a general-purpose metabolism
to allow it to exploit biomass instead of specialized
feedstock, it could in theory get out of control and make
too many copies of itself. Such a design would be quite
difficult and mostly useless, especially if the
functionality were packed in a system too small to be easily
recaptured. But the fact remains that a small,
self-contained, foraging, self-replicating system, if it
were ever built, could do serious damage to the environment.

This risk of biology-eating "gray goo"
arising from nanotechnology research has been publicized for
over a decade.⁸
At this point, science does not have sufficient information
to rule on the likelihood or even the theoretical
possibility of such a risk. This is the sort of case that
the Precautionary Principle was designed for: "The litmus
test for knowing when to apply the precautionary principle
is the combination of threat of harm and scientific
uncertainty."⁹
The strict form would clearly prohibit research that might
lead to gray goo. However, the active form of the
Precautionary Principle might give a very different answer.

The Center for
Responsible Nanotechnology recognizes the possibility of
gray goo, along with the more pressing dangers of dangerous
arms races
and
widespread use of destructive products, if
molecular manufacturing
capability is ever developed. CRN is dedicated to reducing
these risks as far as possible. However, we do not believe
that it will be feasible to enforce a permanent, global
prohibition of advanced nanotechnology. Nuclear
non-proliferation has been more or less successful, but the
fact remains that many nations have gained a nuclear
capability in the last half-century.

Molecular
manufacturing will be based on technologies that are being
developed for many legitimate reasons. Within at most a few
decades, the ability to manipulate complex molecules in
complex ways will be common in a variety of fields,
including biology, electronics, materials science and
medicine. Rapid prototyping and automated assembly are
already being used commercially. On a darker note, the
military potential will ensure that nations do not risk
letting other nations develop nano-fabrication first.
Although it may be possible to delay the development of
molecular manufacturing technology, sooner or later the
world will have to deal with the results of a successful
nanofabricator project.

The fact that
molecular
manufacturing
also promises many

benefits is important for at least two reasons. First,
the promised benefits will encourage the development of the
technology, making it more difficult to enactand
enforceprohibitions. Second, some of the promised benefits
may alleviate serious and global problems, and this must be
included in any assessment of possible courses of action.
For example, nanotechnology-based manufacturing could
produce much less pollution than traditional methods.
Nanoscale products of molecular manufacturing could use
mechanical means to do what is done today by a variety of
dangerous chemicals. Medical products could save millions of
lives. Cheap local manufacturing will reduce the
transportation of goods, and may save land and water by
allowing more efficient farming. Today many nations, both
rich and poor, live unsustainably, and development of
advanced nanotechnology may provide solutions for diverse
and serious environmental problems.

Our Position

Because the strict
form of the Precautionary Principle does not allow
consideration of the risks of inaction, CRN believes that it
is not appropriate as a test of
molecular
manufacturing
policy.
Inaction poses at least three severe risks:

1. 
   

   No other solution
   may be found for certain pressing problems.




2. 
   

   Inaction on the
   part of responsible people could simply lead to the
   development and use of
   molecular
   manufacturing by less
   responsible people.



3. 
   

   Lack of
   understanding of the technology will leave the world
   ill-equipped to deal with irresponsible use.
   

The active form
of the Precautionary Principle, however, seems quite
appropriate as a guide for developing
molecular
manufacturing
policy.
Given the extreme risks presented by misuse of
nanotechnology, it appears imperative to find and implement
the least risky plan that is realistically feasible.

CRN has identified several sources of

risk from
molecular manufacturing,
including arms races, gray goo, societal upheaval,
independent development, and programs of nanotechnology
prohibition that would require violation of human rights. It
appears that the safest option is the creation of oneand
only onedevelopment program, and the widespread but
restricted use of the resulting manufacturing capability.
This opinion, and the reasoning behind it, is explained in
our

other papers. If a safer possibility is suggested, and
appears to be workable, CRN will publicize that possibility;
if a fundamental flaw is found in our current proposal, we
will publicly retract it.

CRN promotes the responsible development of
nanotechnologynot because we believe it is safe, but
because we believe it is riskyand the only realistic
alternative to responsible development is irresponsible
development. Although we cannot agree with the strict form
of the Precautionary Principle, we support the active form,
and we request

feedback from all
readers to improve our understanding of how to further
minimize the risks inherent in this powerful new technology.