The Atlas Burden: The Cost of America’s Nuclear Arsenal
Steven Umbrello
2015-06-18 00:00:00

The cost of maintaining such an arsenal is understandably gargantuan. Over the next ten years, the American government plans to spend as much as $350 billion maintaining and upgrading its nuclear infrastructure. These upgrades include:

…designing a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a new long-range bomber with nuclear capability, and a new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Plans also include studying options for the next-generation land-based ICBM; deploying a new nuclear-capable tactical fighter aircraft; completing full-scale production of one nuclear warhead and beginning modernization work on two others, including the first-ever guided nuclear bomb; modernizing nuclear command-and-control facilities; and building new nuclear weapon production and simulation facilities. (US Nuclear Forces 2015)




However, this $350 billion only accounts for the direct costs of maintenance and modernization; it forgoes the indirect costs of such a task, which include the eventual retirement of systems as well as the pensions and healthcare costs of veteran service workers. Accounting for these variables, it is safe to assume that the cost of deterrence on the American populace is much greater than anticipated.

In 2005, it was reported by the Government Accountability Office (GOA) that the Department of Defense was unable to accurately estimate the precise cost of the nuclear arsenal. As it stands, there is no single nuclear budget, thus it is a challenge to calculate and project the fiscal consequences of the deterrence system. In order to do so, a piecemeal estimate must be determined by gathering budget information related to the cost of arsenal maintenance.

The government plans to continue these upgrades over the next several decades. The cost of these new plans is estimated to grow in tandem, projected to increase approximately $30 billion every year over the next decade. Maintaining, let alone upgrading, is not a sustainable outcome.

Understanding our Nuclear Burden

Understanding the purpose behind the continued possession of nuclear weapons helps us to see how and why we need alternatives. Essentially, nuclear weapons exist so that nuclear war can be averted. As long as at least two parties have nuclear weapons, then it would not be in their interest to use them against other nuclear states. To do so would be M.A.D., or mutually assured destruction. Thus, the purpose of continuing to maintain, and even upgrade the US nuclear infrastructure, would be to continue to preserve the status quo of deterrence. However, it would be fallacious to claim that only nuclear weapons possess the gravitas of M.A.D deterrence.

Firstly, aside from the obvious destructive power of nuclear weapons, a nuclear war amongst nuclear states would have devastating environmental consequences. The fallout would inevitably cause nuclear winter, thus bottlenecking biological life on the planet. The imperative of a nuclear state is to continue maintaining its deterrence policy. Doing so entails possessing an arsenal of weapons that can cause enough destructive force to warrant aversion to war. Up until now nuclear weapons have done that job, but a more affordable, equally life-threatening and less environmentally dangerous alternative should be considered.



Seeking Arrangements

In his paper Winter-Safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence, Dr. Seth Baum proposes a few alternative methods of deterrence that could be adopted in place of nuclear weapons.

Non-contagious biological weapons are one such substitute. Although the sound of ‘bio-weapon’ evokes a strong emotional response in people, they nonetheless pose as a real alternative. Since potential deterrents must be capable of destroying large populations, then NCBWs are a viable option. They have the capacity to wipe out large portions of populations, remain localized while at the same time leave existing infrastructure unmolested. Also, they are much easier and more affordable to produce than nuclear weapons. Both Ricin and Anthrax are easy and cost-effective to produce in large quantities. Because of this, proliferation of NCBWs would be easier than nuclear weapons, but with sufficient oversight it would not be inconceivable to manage.

EMPs or Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons would be another such alternative to nuclear weapons. An EMP weapon is a device that emits a large electromagnetic pulse that renders all non-shielded electronic equipment in its area of effect useless. Unlike other conventional weapons, aside from cyber-weapons, electromagnetic pulses do not harm individuals, aside from the consequences of the technological infrastructure becoming unusable. Likewise, the environment remains unmolested and the globe would be safe from nuclear winter. Secondly, the area of effect that EM weapons are capable of covering is potentially massive. The most effective EM weapons are nuclear warheads detonated at high altitudes. By doing so the effectiveness of the blast itself is negligible and only the EM pulse is used for the attack. This means that the number of EM weapons necessary for creating deterrence-based geopolitical stability would be far lower and less costly than that of nuclear weapons. Although more research and experimentation is needed to better understand the effectiveness of EM weapons and their suitability as deterrence alternatives, their candidacy is certainly one that cannot be dismissed.

Checks and Balances

The costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal are monumental. This is not only measured in monetary terms, but also in regards to their effect on the environment and infrastructure should a nuclear war break out. The above two options present clear alternatives that are both cost-effective and less environmentally devastating than conventional nuclear weapons, while at the same time continue to maintain the critical factor of deterrence. America and other nuclear states have come to a juncture, one where they have to weigh the costs and benefits of continuing this expensive status quo of nuclear deterrence; alternatives exist with the same ‘benefit’ and only marginal costs. The taxpayers need not bear this burden on their shoulders forever.

Image #1: Mk-28 Thermonuclear bombs

Image #2: Nagasaki Bomb


Works Cited

Baum, Seth. "Deterrence, Without Nuclear Winter." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March 10, 2015. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Baum, Seth. “Winter-Safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence” February, 23, 2015. Accessed May 12, 2015.

GAO, "Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-Term Investment Approach," www.gao.gov

Korb, Lawrence. "The United States Should Reduce Its Nuclear Arsenal." ThinkProgress RSS. February 13, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Kristensen, Hans M. "Trimming Nuclear Excess Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces." Federation of American Scientists 5 (2012).

Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association (Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association)

Shwartz, Stephen I., and Deepti Choubey. "Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.

Status of World Nuclear Forces - Federation Of American Scientists (Federation Of American Scientists)

"US Nuclear Forces, 2015" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook 7, no. 2 (2015): 107-19. .