In a sense, Hitler was very rational in seeking the most efficient means of committing genocide. But was the end/goal of genocide rational? The principle of non-contradiction does not seem to determine this.

We can distinguish several different kinds of rationality. “Substantial rationality” can be understood to mean “an act of thought that reveals intelligent insight into the inter-relations of events in a given situation.” (Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1940, p. 53.) Thus, if a person were to have insight into the functioning of an electrical circuit, that would be an instance of substantial rationality. Let’s use the term “rational^S” and its cognates to refer to substantial rationality.

“Instrumental rationality” or “functional rationality” involves “the coordination of action with reference to a goal. This is a type of rationality that has to do with the intelligent use of means to achieve a given goal. Here, the goal is given, and instrumental rationality applies to the intelligent choice of means. Thus, if we were to have a goal of sending human^B beings to Mars, we would have to think about whether a rocket could accomplish the goal. Would it be an effective means? But instrumental rationality does not bring the goal itself into question.” (Daryl J. Wennemann, Posthuman Personhood, p. 74. http://www.amazon.com

The term “human^B” refers to biological human beings. The term human^M will refer to morally human beings or persons.) Let’s use the term “rational^I” and its cognates to refer to instrumental rationality. It should be noticed that rationality^S is implicated in the coordination of action with reference to a goal. But the choice of effective means to achieve a goal involves more than just having an insight into the inter-relations of events.

“Reflexive rationality” is a type of rationality that is directed to the intelligent choice of rational ends. A rational end is one that is consistent with reflexive rationality. Let’s use the term “rational^R” and its cognates to refer to reflexive rationality.

​So, if I were to choose an end or goal that undermines rational^R goal-seeking, it would not be a goal that is consistent with reflexive rationality, since reflexive rationality is the standard for rational^R goal-seeking. Thus, to intentionally kill a human^B being is not a rational^R goal because human^B beings are beings of a kind that are capable of rational^R goal-seeking. They are human^M ie., persons. The human^B being I kill is no longer able to seek rational^R goals. It is important to observe that reflexive rationality (rationality^R) is concerned with rational^R goal-seeking as such, not just my own rational^R goal-seeking. And so, any goal that undermines rational^R goal-seeking is morally impermissible. Again, if I were to impose a law on someone (heteronomy of the will) I would effectively be denying the person the ability to choose her/his own rational^R goals. My goal of imposing a law on someone would undermine rational^R goal-seeking. And so, it is not a rational^R goal.

These distinctions help us to see why it is not inappropriate to refer to Hitler as a “rational monster”. Given his goal of committing genocide, he efficiently pursued the goal. The means he employed were rational^I. But the goal of genocide was itself not rational^R. This is also what Francis Fukuyama is worried about in Our Posthuman Future. If we choose to alter ourselves biologically and the change we make undermines our ability to make rational^R choices, then the choice of the goal to alter ourselves biologically is not rational^R. It would be a case of rational^R goal-seeking that undermines our rational^R goal-seeking.

Images: 

http://www.trendhunter.com/trends/inside-the-mind-of-a-startup-entrepreneur

http://vi.sualize.us/05cerebro_tatuado_814_800_pixels_art_anatomy

_painting_illustration_picture_471K.html

http://the-surreal-arts.deviantart.com/art/Don-t-f-ck-my-brain-42983724