The last few years have seen scientific advancements that were thought to be possible only in the realm of science fiction. From nuclear transfer to exogenous pregnancies, implantable brain chips to transgenic engineering, cyborg to chimera, we may be taking the next step in our own evolution. As barriers between the species begin to blur and blend, should humans retain special elevated status? How will these affect notions of “personhood”? Possible implications range from affecting the abortion debate to end-of-life decision making to animal rights. If traditional notions of personhood prevail, are we running the risk of denying essential basic liberties to sentient beings? If modern expanded notions of personhood prevail, do we run the risk of somehow being “degraded” and losing our “human dignity”? Legal notions of personhood have lagged far behind the philosophical and ethical discourse, yet some courts and legislatures have seen fit to extend the definition by creating legal fictions to recognize such entities as corporations and ships as “persons.” The law has been notoriously slow in keeping up with ethical issues and technological advances; legislatures are loath to deal with controversy and courts must often wait until litigation arises out of a crisis. The next several decades will test the flexibility of the law in response to evolving advancements.
In this thesis, I analyze and review the literature of classical ethical, religious and legal definitions of personhood. I explore which significant developments in biotechnology may affect evolving legal and ethical notions of personhood; I also outline a rubric for considering the definition and scope of the human identity as “person” from different research perspectives, including legal, philosophical, ethical and technological. Finally, I examine whether or not there is a recurrent theme, a common thread, commensurability, some unifying underlying principle, in philosophical and theological perspectives and in the decisions made by courts, legislatures, and governmental agencies. In my quest for commensurability, I argue that a balancing approach is warranted, resulting in an expanded, evolving notion of personhood.
Link to full article